CAO estimates that as of July 2011, these 93 states have issued more than 345 million e-passports, of which almost 340 million are in circulation.Article, maps & stats at the link.
As per ICAO specifications, each of these documents contains a contactless integrated circuit chip that stores biometric data–i.e. facial, fingerprint or iris–of the passport holder as well as other encrypted identification data. Forty-five of the e-passport issuing states store both fingerprint and facial data on their documents, while 34 store only the facial data. The remaining 14 states currently use facial data, but will begin including fingerprints by the end of 2011.
Showing posts with label RFID. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RFID. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
E-passports spread to half the globe
Nearly half of all United Nations (U.N.) member states are now issuing biometric e-passports (Contactless News)
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Miami Herald: Worst performing gadget of the year is Biometric Wallet
The year’s most memorable gadgets (Miami Herald)
The TungstenW biometric wallet. Made of carbon fiber, this hard case wallet only opens with the owner’s fingerprint scan ... unless you drop it, in which case it easily pops right open and breaks. For $600, this theft-prevention wallet is a dud. All the thief needs to do is give it a whack against a table or floor.I think they're talking about this one. (Tiger Direct)
Friday, September 3, 2010
German gov downplays biometric ID card hack
Nicht ein biggie [TheRegister.co.uk]
No security regimen is perfect.
Wise adopters of biometric ID management solutions will:
It is often possible to save money and improve security at the same time.
The German government appears to be of the opinion that the new system, even if imperfect, is more secure than the old system. I'll accept that as a given.
One thing Germany might consider: Would it be better to put a template generated by the fingerprint on the card rather than an image of the fingerprint itself?
There are good reasons for wanting the entire fingerprint, but storing it on the card itself reduces the security of the information and will probably lead to a larger opt-out rate than would be the case if the card only held the template.
Another article on this story can be read at TheLocal.de.
German hackers successfully used off-the-shelf kit to extract personal data from the federal government's supposedly secure ID cards, but the government has downplayed the significance of the attack.This is one of those "compared to what" situations.
No security regimen is perfect.
Wise adopters of biometric ID management solutions will:
- Complete an honest assessment of the security of their current solution
- Tally the costs associated with the current solution
- Compare these data to the value proposition of a contemplated improved solution
- Compare any gains in security to the change in the costs associated with the solution.
It is often possible to save money and improve security at the same time.
The German government appears to be of the opinion that the new system, even if imperfect, is more secure than the old system. I'll accept that as a given.
One thing Germany might consider: Would it be better to put a template generated by the fingerprint on the card rather than an image of the fingerprint itself?
There are good reasons for wanting the entire fingerprint, but storing it on the card itself reduces the security of the information and will probably lead to a larger opt-out rate than would be the case if the card only held the template.
Another article on this story can be read at TheLocal.de.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
British Government: Anti-RFID passport cover 'preys on fears'
A Home Office spokeswoman said: "The data encoded to the chip in the biometric passport is securely stored and contains no more personal data than the information printed on the data page of a passport.
"There is no evidence to suggest anyone's personal data has been stolen from a passport's RFID chip. The passport chip does not have the same communication protocol and therefore it is not physically possible for the chip to be read from the distance suggested."
I've made no secret of my curiosity about the RFID-blocking passport holder.
The Home Office seems to be responding to the article that inspired this post (and probably many others).
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Bad guys could read RFID passports at 217 feet, maybe a lot more
OK, I must acknowledge that my repeated references to the RFID blocking passport wallet on offer from ThinkGeek.com here and here have been a bit tongue-in-cheek, though I love the site and its humorous product descriptions.
I figured that if there was a real danger that the information was insecure, the designers of the passport could and would take countermeasures, perhaps by integrating a stainless steel wire mesh into the covers of the document itself, making it readable only when the booklet is opened (this could make the document more durable, too).
Alternatively, I thought a that criminal operation that relied upon waving an RFID reader a few centimeters from where an individual carries their passport would face labor costs that couldn't be justified by the benefits of collecting the data the first place.
If this article is accurate, I'm not so sure this isn't something people should at least be aware of. The apparatus described in the article is like moving from rod-and-reel fishing, to using drag-nets, with the commensurate efficiency gains.
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